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ABSTRACT 
Holb rook 'ii or k ing has described hedging as "speculation on the 
basis" and has argued that traders engage in hedging because they 
believe they can do better from hedging than from not hedging, in 
contrast to the Keynes-Hicks-Kaldor view that hedging is an activity 
undertaken to shift risk to other traders. 
In .this paper, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions 
for hedging ("speculation on the basis"} to be preferred by all risk 
averse traders to speculating on the cash market. When the futures 
market is in fact a forward market, then short hedging is p referred to 
not hedging by all risk averse traders if and only if there is a 
contango on the market. In the case of a "true" futures market, it is 
shown that short hedging is prefer red to an unhedged position by all 
risk averse traders if and only if the "Houthakker ef fect" is 
sufficiently strong. These results are derived for the "all or 
nothing" case of comparisons between an unhedged and a completely 
hedged position. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
HEDGING AS "SPECULATION ON THE BASIS" 
James Quirk 
There are two distinct schools of thought in the classical 
literature dealing with hedging and the futures markets. The older 
tradition stems from Keynes (1930 ), Hicks (1939), and Kaldor (1940 ), 
all of whom viewed hedging as behavior engaged in with the objective 
of transferring price risk from the hedger to some other trader. When 
short and long hedging are balanced on the futures market, then no 
risk premium arises on the market, but if short hedging dominates, as 
these earlier authors assumed, then backwardation emerges on the 
futures market (current futures price is less than its expected value 
at the termination of the futures contract), and short hedgers pay a 
risk premium on average to long hedgers and to speculators. 
A completely different view of hedging emerges in the writings 
of Holbrook Working (1953), and later in Houthakker (1968) and Cootner 
(1960 ). As Working points out, the Keynes-Hicks-Kaldor approach in 
effect treats hedging as an afterthought on the part of a trader who 
has taken some (risky) position in the cash market and only then 
begins to think about the possibility of "laying off" a part or all of 
his price risks through hedging. In contrast, Working argues that a 
rational trader makes a simultaneous choice of a cash and futures 
position, taking into account hedging possibilities at the time a cash 
position is entered into. 
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There is one other critical difference between Working's 
approach and that of the earlier authors. Implicit in the Keynes­
Hicks-Kaldor approach is the notion that hedgers can attain "perfect 
hedges" through their dealings in the futures market, so that hedging 
can completely eliminate price risks. But in order for this to occur, 
the futures contract would have to be a forward contract, that is, a 
contract such that the price of the futures contract at the maturity 
date of the contract is identically equal to the cash price. This is 
not the case in commodity futures markets; in order to avoid problems 
of thinness of the market and/or cornering, futures contracts provide 
for a range of grade-location delivery options, the option to be 
selected by the seller of the contract at the maturity date of the 
contract. 
The consequence is that hedging through use of the futures 
market cannot eliminate all price risks for hedgers. Working 
emphasizes this by referring to hedging as simply another kind of 
speculation, namely, "speculation on the basis. " The basis at any 
point in time is defined as the difference between the cash price and 
the futures price at that point in time. In effect, a trader who 
decides to engage in a cash commitment coupled with a hedging 
commitment in the futures market does so, according to the Working 
view, because he expects to do better from this decision than from the 
alternatives, namely, an unhedged cash position, or no cash or futures 
position at all. 
Hedging is a wide spread phenomenon among elevator operators 
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and millers, and is also occasionally engaged in by farmers. 
Working's view of hedging raises the general question as to why, or 
under what conditions, speculation on the basis by these or other 
traders will offer advantages over speculation in the cash market. In 
the recent theoretical literature dealing with futures markets (for 
example, see Anderson and Danthine (1983)), the emphasis has been on 
the simultaneity of choice of cash and futures commitments, but in the 
context of a forward market, one in which hedges are perfect. In the 
present paper, we turn to Working's argument that hedging is in fact a 
form of speculation, because of the existence of several delivery 
options under the futures contract. The point of the paper is to 
derive conditions necessary and/or sufficient such that any risk 
averse trader would prefer speculating on the basis to the other 
alternatives available to him. We do this in a simplified setting, 
namely one in which the cash commitment is taken as given, with the 
choice of the trader of the "all or nothing" variety, that is, a 
choice between an unhedged or a completely hedged position. In this 
setting, identification of the circumstances under which speculation 
on the basis is preferred by a trader to speculating in the cash 
market is relatively straight forward; moreover, analysis of this 
problem provides a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a 
mixed portfolio of hedged and unhedged stocks to be preferred to an 
unhedged position. 
We examine the hedging problem in the context of a model in 
which there are two delivery options admissible under the futures 
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contract. Extension of the results to the case of many delivery 
options creates some notational clutter, but involves no new 
conceptual problems. We look separately at two cases: first, the case 
of a forward market (in effect the two delivery options are perfect 
substitutes for one another); and second, the case of a "true" futures 
market, one in which the options are less than perfect substitutes for 
one another. This is a two period model, one in which the cash and 
futures markets open at time t = 0 ,  and again at time t = 1. There is 
only one futures contract available, maturing at time t = 1. In a 
rational expectations framework (see Lien and Quirk (1984)), and given 
only a single futures contract, the two period model represents no 
substantive restriction on an n-period model, but the restriction to 
only one futures contract does limit the applicability of the results 
(see Anderson and Danthine (1983)). Throughout the paper, it is 
assumed that all traders are risk averse. 
The basic conclusions of the paper are these. When the 
futures contract is in fact a forward contract, then hedges are 
perfect and speculating on the basis is preferred to speculating on 
the cash market by every risk averse trader contemplating a short 
hedge if and only if there is a contango on the futures market 
(expected value of the futures price is less than or equal to the 
current futures price); speculating on the basis is preferred to 
speculating on the cash market by every risk averse trader 
contemplating a long hedge if and only if there is backwardation on 
the futures market (expected value of the futures price exceeds or is 
equal to the current futures price). When we turn to a true futures 
market, then the necessary and sufficient condition for hedging to be 
preferred to speculating on the cash market for every risk averse 
trader is obtained by an application of the Hadar and Russell (1969) 
result on stochastic dominance. Given this dominance condition, it is 
shown that the Houthakker effect (s�e Houthakker (1968)) plays a 
pivotal role in determining the desirability of speculating on the 
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basis versus speculating on the cash market. By the Houthakker effect 
we mean the idea that the cash and futures prices are more highly 
correlated at low than at high cash prices. If the Houthakker effect 
is "sufficiently strong," than speculating on the basis is preferred 
to speculating on the cash market. Thus the approach adopted in this 
paper represents a way of bringing together the contributions of 
Working and Houthakker, extending some results derived in a recent 
paper (see Fort and Quirk (1983)). 
2. THE HODEL 
Consider a futures contract under which two delivery (grade-
location) options are admissible under the contract. This is a two 
period world in which trading in the cash and futures markets occurs 
at t 0 and t = 1. There is only one futures contact, which matures 
at t = 1. 
Let p�, 
options, and let 
c qt . 
f pt' 
t = 0 ,1 denote the cash prices of the two delivery 
t = 0 ,1 denote the futures price. Because choice 
of the option to deliver at the maturity date of the futures contract 
is up to the seller of the contract, we have: 
f c c 
P1 = min(pl,ql) 
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(1) 
Let f(p� . q�) be the joint probability density function held by 
a trader at t = 0 over the cash prices at t = l, and let d(p�,pi> 
denote the joint pdf over the t = 1 cash price of the first option and 
the futures price, held by the trader at t = O. Then from (1), 
c f dCp1, p1) is given by: 
0 
c f  �( c c c d(pl,pl) = c f(pl,ql)dql 
P1 
c f) f(pl,pl 
f c 
P1 > P1 
f c 
P1 = P1 
f c 
P1 < P1 
Similarly, we can construct the pdf over the basis for the 
trader, using ( 2). Let bt denote the basis at time t = 0 ,1, with 
respect to the first delivery option, so that 
given by 
c f c f bo = Po - Po· bl = P1 - P1 
Let �Cb1) be the pdf over b1 held by the trader at t o . 
( 2) 
(3) 
0 
. .. .. 
I I c c c c c f(pl .ql )dql dpl 0 Pl 
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b1 < 0 
bl = 0 
t<b1l =� ( 4) 
... 
I c c c c f(p1.p1 - b1)dp1 0 < b1 i p1 0 
0 bl > p� 
The link between the basis and hedging comes through the 
profit function for the trader. Consider the case of a trader 
contemplating taking a long position of W bushels in the cash market 
for the first delivery option at t = o. as in the case of an elevator 
operator. Let k(W) be a strictly convex function representing the 
"carrying costs" tor the trader. including interest. insurance. 
storage losses. and normal profits. If the trader takes an unhedged 
position. then his profits are given by (p� - p�)W - k(W). Let k
denote per bushel carrying costs. and let nu denote the per bushel 
profit from an unhedged commitment of W bushels. Then we have 
c c -nu = P1 - Po - k ( 5) 
In contrast. consider the case of a trader who takes the same 
long position in the cash market. but hedges the commitment by going 
short in the futures market • .  Let nH denote the per bushel profit from 
short hedging, so that nH satisfies 
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c c t t -nH = P1 - Po + Po - P1 - k (6) 
Rearranging (6) we have 
nH = b1 - b0 - k (7) 
so that Working's description ot hedging as speculating on the basis 
is an apt one. 
S1m11arly. traders such as millers who take a short position 
in the cash market (accepting orders· for processed wheat products 
before buying the wheat to fill those orders) • can hedge the short 
cash position by going long in the futures market. Under the 
conventional assumption that wheat requirements are met through 
purchases at t = 1 followed by instantaneous processing. and that the 
wheat equivalent price of the milled product is the t = O cash price 
plus carrying cost. the corresponding unhedged and hedged profit 
functions for a miller with a commitment of W bushels. can be written 
as 
n
• 
= pc - P
c + k u 0 1 
• 
nH =.b0 - b1 + k 
where the asterisk is used to identify traders short in the cash 
market. 
In what follows. we will concentrate on the case of traders 
long in the cash market. We are interested in deriving conditions 
(8) 
(9) 
under which speculating on the basis is preferred by any such trader. 
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to speculating on the cash market, given a commitment of W bushels of 
wheat. For such a trader, let g (nu) denote the pdf over per bushel 
profits from speculating in the cash market, and let h (nH) denote the 
pdf over per bushel profits from speculating on the basis. Using (2)-
( 7), we have the following: 
g (nu> = ... 
{' 
c - c c f of (nu + Po+ k, ql)dql 
c nu < - (po + k) 
(10 )  
- (p� + k) i nu i "' 
0 f c 
-
nH < Po - (p0 + k) � - (b0 + k) 
h (nH) 
... ... 
J S c c c c f(pl, ql)dqldpl 0 c 
P1 
S... c c c - f c f( P1· P1 - CnH + Po+ k - Po>ldpl 0 
f c -nH = Po - (po + k) (11) 
f c 
Po -(po + k) < nH 
c f c (Note that f (·, ·> = O for nH > p1 + Po - Cp0 + k)).
Let G (nu), H (nH) denote the cdf's associated with g and h.
These can then be written as 
G (nu> = � 
0 
n u ... J J c - c c f(x + p0 + k, q1Jdq1dx-(p�+k) 0 
c nu < -< Po + k)
- (p� + k) i nu i "' 
(12) 
H (nH) 
0 
... ... 
I I c c c c c f(pl , ql )dqldpl 0 p1 
n "' 
S
H J c c  c- f c + f c - f( P1· P1-<x+po+k-polldp1dx p0 -Cp0+kl o 
f c -nH < pO -pO+k 
for 
f c -p0-Cp0+klinH 
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(13) 
We are interested in examining the conditions under which h is 
preferred by any risk averse trader to g, so that speculating on the
basis for a given long cash commitment is preferred to speculating on 
the cash market. Because of the way in which the problem has been 
posed here, it is possible to apply directly the Hadar-Russell (1969) 
result on second degree stochastic dominance, that is, h is preferred 
to g for every risk averse trader if and only if 
� H (t)dt i Jn G (t)dt for all n , 
_.., --
with strict inequality for some n. 
We proceed to apply this to the problem of our paper. 
3 • THE CASE OF A FORWARD MARKET 
(14) 
It is instructive to consider first the admittedly unrealistic 
case of a forward market, a market in which perfect hedges occur. In 
the context of the model of this paper, the forward market case is one 
in which our two delivery options are perfect substitutes for one 
another in the sense that 
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f(p�, q�) = O for p� I q� 
Under this condition, the expressions for G and H given above 
reduce to 
G (:n:) F (:n: + p� + k) - (p� + k) ! :n: ! "' 
H (" • {: 
f c -
:n: < Po - <Po + k) 
:n: l p� - (p� + k) 
In (15), F (:n: +pg + k) is the cdf of f evaluated at p� = q� 
(15) 
= :n: + p� + k. (In what follows, in dealing with forward contracts we
will use the notation f(x) = f(x , x )  and F (x )  a F (x, x) for any x . )
Then, i n  the case of a forward market, we have the following 
result concerning necessary and sufficient conditions for speculating 
on the basis to be the preferred alternative for any risk averse 
trader contemplating a particular long position on the cash market: 
Proposition 1. (See also Anderson and Danthine (1983)). Given a 
forward market, then every risk averse trader with a long commitment 
of W bushels in the cash market will prefer to "speculate on the 
basis" rather than to speculate on the cash market if and only if 
pg + k < Epf ! p�; that is, expected per bushel profit from the cash 
commitment is positive, and there is a contango on the futures market. 
Proof: To lessen the notational clutter, let a =  p� + k. We wish to 
show that 
:n: :n: 
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J_aG (t)dt 2 f_aH (t)dt (16) 
for all :n: 2 -a, with strict inequality for some :n:, if and only if 
f f Ep1 i Po• 
From (15), we know that (16) holds for -a! :n: < p� -a. 
Consider then :n: 2 p� -a, where we wish to show that 
r7' :n: :n: J _aG (t)dt = J_aF (t + a)dt 2 :n: -[p� - (p� + k)] = f_aH (t)dt
f f if and only if Ep1 ! Po· 
have 
"' 
Define p by p� - (p� + k) PEg:n: = Pf_a:n:f(:n: + a)d:n:, and let 
S:n: f c J (p;:n:) = -aF (t + a)dt - [:n: -<p0 -<p0 + k))] 
:n: . "' 
= f_a{F (t +a) + Ptf (t +a)} dt + p f tf(t + a)dt - :n: :n: 
Adding and subtracting tf (t + a) inside the first integral, we 
:n: :n: 
J (p;:n:) = f {F (t + a) + tf(t + a)} dt + Cp - 1) f tf(t + a)dt -a -a 
"' 
+Pf tfCt + a)dt - :n: 
:n: 
:n: "' 
J(p;:n:) = :n:F (:n: +a) + CP - llf_atf(t + a)dt +Pf tf (t + a)dt - :n: :n: 
:n: "' 
CP - 1>f_atf(t + a)dt + f Cpt - :n:)f(t + a)dt 
:n: 
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Note that �; = -J mf(t + a)dt � O, so that J{Jl;n) 2 0 for all
n 
n 2 -a if and only if lim J{Jl;n) 2 O. 
n-+z> 
But lim J{Jl;n) = (JI - l)Egn. n -+z> 
Egn e Epf -(p� + k) > 0 if a risk averse trader is to take a 
commitment in the cash market, and hence lim J{Jl;n) 
n -+z> 
2 o if and only 
if JI 2 1, that is p� - (p� + k) 2 Egn' or f f Po 2 Ep1. 
Q.E.D. 
Similarly, it can be shown that in a forward market, any risk 
averse trader short in the cash market will prefer hedging his 
commitment to speculating in the cash market if and only if his 
expected profits are positive and there is backwardation on the 
f f futures market, that is, Ep1 2 Po· 
But of course the case of a forward market was not the case 
that Working was interested in, nor is it our main concern here. Next 
we turn to the case of "true" futures market, one in which there is a 
nondegenerate joint pdf over the cash prices P� .q�. 
4. THE CASE OF A "TRUE" FUTURES MARKET 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for speculating on the 
basis to be preferred to speculating on the cash market, for any risk 
averse trader with a given long commitment in the cash market, can be 
derived through a specialization of the Hadar-Russell condition, as 
indicated in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. Given a futures market with Ep� > p� + k, then every 
risk averse trader with a long cash commitment of W bushels will 
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prefer speculating on the basis to speculating in the cash market if 
and only if condition (*) obtains: 
Sn Jt+a J
m c c c c (*)J(n) = _ f{p1, q1)dq1dp1dt a o O 
s:�-·[ ( S:: c c c c f(pl. ql )dql dpl 
m 
+ J f t-po+a 
c 1
rP1 c c c cj 
J c f f (pl . ql)dqldpl 
P1-t+po-a 
dt 2 0 
for n 2 p� -a, where a = p� + k, and with strict inequality for some 
n. 
Proof: Change of variables, using (12), (13) and (14), together with 
( 5) and (6), and the constraint q� 2 o. 
The question that arises is that of an interpretation of (•). 
In particular, the approach to hedging taken by Houthakker (1968) is 
suggestive. Houthakker was concerned with the problem of 
backwardation, and argued that a preponderance of short over long 
hedging can be expected on commodity futures markets (at least for 
much of the inter-harvest period) because any cash price is more 
closely correlated with other cash prices and hence with the futures 
price, at low than at high cash prices. The reason for this is that 
low cash prices tend to occur when inventories of all grade-location 
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combinations are large, and it is at this time that the prices of the 
different grade-location combinations tend to be determined by their 
common properties, rather than by those distinctive properties that 
operate to produce premiums or penalties in specialized markets for 
the various grade-location combinations. When a cash price is more 
closely correlated with the futures price at low that at high cash 
prices, then this tends to encourage short hedging, since the short 
hedger hedges in part to protect himself against the possibility of 
low cash prices. 
In earlier work on this "Houthakker effect" (see Fort and 
Quirk (1983), it was shown that from an analytical point of view, a 
convenient specification of the Houthakker effect is in terms of the 
probabilities of the cash and futures prices being "close" to one 
another. In this version, a Houthakker effect is said to be present 
if the probability of the cash and futures prices being "close" to one 
another is large at low cash prices, relative to the probability of 
the prices being close to one another at high cash prices. 
Admittedly, this leaves things somewhat vague; in order to establish 
restrictive propositions concerning the Houthakker effect and hedging, 
it is necessary to specify just what is meant by the terms "close to 
one another," "large," "small," etc. Nonetheless, the notion of a 
Houthakker effect as thus specified does turn out to have an 
interesting explanatory role in the analysis of backwardation, and, as 
it turns out, in providing some insight into the interpretation of 
condition (•). 
To see this, let s= t + a  in (•), and rearrange and collect 
terms in J(n) so that (•) can be written as: 
f 
(•')J(n) = �O � J
m
f(·)dq�dp�ds
0 0 0 
+ sn+a 
p f 0 [ r. 
m m m 
S c c s s c c fC·ldq1dp1 - fC·ldq0 dq1 o O pc 1 
m 1 C C f - J ff c f f(·)dq1dp1 ds 2 O for n + a  2 p0 
c 
l s-po P1+po-s
This can be rewritten as
(•")J(n) 
f 
S m 
= {
0 
J Jc 0 0 P1 
c c f( ·)dq1dp1ds
S 
C 
liD CD 
+�
+as t._
1 f(·)dq�dp�ds - s
n
;
a f s s c 0 0 0 Po s P1 L 
c 
c c f(. )dql dpl 
m 
J
P1 + J f c+pf-ss-po P1 o 
c cl f(·)dq1dp1 ds 2 f o for n + a L Po 
Suppose there is a martingale equilibrium so that p� = Epi. 
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In this case we have the expected value of profits under hedging equal 
to the expected value of profits from an unhedged position, that is, 
c Epl P
c - k = Epc 0 1 p
c + pf _ Epf _ k 0 0 1 
1 7 
Hence when condition (*") holds at a martingale equilibrium, g 
is a mean preserving increase in the spread of h, in the sense of 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970 ). 
Using the fact that pi = min(p�,q�), the first term in J(n) 
under (*") is the integral up to p� of the probability that p� = pi, 
0 i p� i s, O i s i p�. Treating p� < p� as relatively "low" cash 
prices, then presence of a Houthakker effect implies that this term 
tends to relatively "large," and of course it enters into J(n) with a 
positive sign. 
n + a  
Again 
Similarly, the third term in J(n) is the integral from p� to 
of the probability that p� = pi, s i p� i CD, p� i s i n + a. 
viewing p� as the dividing line between low and high cash 
prices, the presence of a Houthakker effect implies that this term is 
relatively "small," and it enters J(n) with a negative sign. 
Hence, ceteris paribus, the presence of a Houthakker effect, 
in the sense we have used this term, tends to increase J(n) and hence 
increases the likelihood that speculating on the basis will dominate 
speculating on the cash market so far as risk averse traders are 
concerned. Needless to say, the condition (*") requires more than 
simply the presence of a Houthakker effect; instead the effect must be 
"strong enough." 
We formalize this as follows 
Proposition 3. Given a futures market with Ep� > p� + k, then every 
risk averse trader with a long cash commitment of W bushels will 
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prefer to speculate on the basis rather than to speculate on the cash 
market if and only if the Houthakker effect is "strong enough" in the 
sense that 
f 
CD CD CD 
t0 r J c O 0 P1 
c c sn+a J s c c f(·)dq1dp1ds - f c f(·)dq1dp1ds 2 
Po s P1 
Jn;a 
Po 
0 
CD p J f J ! f s-po P1+ Po-s f(·)dq�dp�ds -
c 
r+a t (1 0 0 0 
for all n + a 2 p�. strict inequality for some n. 
Proof: Immediate. 
c c f( ·)dq1dp1ds
Clearly Proposition 3 could also be restated using a notion of 
"closeness" of p� to pi such as p� - pi i_ e for some given e > 0, and 
similarly cut offs for "low" and "high" cash prices different from p� 
could be employed. The important point is that the presence of a 
Houthakker effect as thus specified provides a simple and intuitive 
interpretation to the dominance condition (*'') which represents a 
formalization of conditions under which Working's view of hedging as 
speculation on the basis represents an activity that is preferred to 
speculation on the cash market by any risk averse trader. Furthermore, 
condition (*'') utilizes all of the information that a trader brings 
to the market, namely his joint density over the cash prices and his 
knowledge of the effects of arbitrage on the determination of the 
futures price. 
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Finally, we should note that (*'') provides a necessary and
sufficient condition for a fully hedged position to be preferred to an 
unhedged position, given a long cash commitment of W bushels. This 
means that (*'') also provides a sufficient condition for the optimal 
choice of a trader with a long cash commitment of W bushels to involve 
some speculating on the basis, although of course the condition is not 
necessary in the case of such a diversified portfolio. 
SUMMARY 
This paper has been concerned with identifying conditions 
under which any risk averse (short) hedger would prefer to speculate 
on the basis than to speculate in the cash market. In the case of a 
forward market, hedging in fact involves no speculation at all, and we 
arrive at the usual condition that short hedging is preferred to an 
unhedged commitment by all risk averse traders if and only if there is 
a contango on the market. 
The case of a forward market has little in the way of 
predictive validity for functioning futures markets, however, and 
Working's contributions to the literature on futures markets are aimed 
at analyzing how these markets operate, rather than the idealized 
forward markets of the theoretical literature. What has been derived 
here is the stochastic dominance condition (•) (or (*'')) under which 
speculating on the basis is preferred by any risk averse short hedger 
to an unhedged long cash position with the same cash commitment. It 
has been shown that this is eq uivalent to the statement that the 
Houthakker effect is "sufficiently strong. " The Houthakker effect 
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thus appears to play a central role in the analysis of hedging on 
functioning futures markets, and in particular provides an insight 
into how one may interpret Working's comments concerning the view that 
traders speculate on the basis when they feel that they can do better 
from that operation than from other alternatives available to them. 
21 
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